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NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL:
CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES IN 2013
Steven Pifer
Senior Fellow
Director, Arms Control Initiative
October 10, 2012

Lecture Outline
• How further nuclear arms reductions and
arms control can enhance US security
• Arms control opportunities
• Arms control challenges

Reduced Enough Already?

New START Treaty
• Each side limited to no more than
• 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles
• 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers
and heavy bombers
• 1550 deployed strategic warheads
• Limits to be implemented by 2018

• US-Russian strategic balance stable and
numbers declining … need to do more?

WHY PURSUE FURTHER
NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL?

Reduce Strategic Threat to US
• Under New START,
Russia can still have
~2000 deployed
strategic warheads
• Most 7-55 times the
power of “Little Boy”
and “Fat Man”

Limit Nonstrategic
(Tactical) Weapons
• Not constrained by
any treaty
• Concern to US allies

• Russian numerical
advantage
• Strategic vs nonstrategic

Transparency
• Data exchange and
updates
• Notifications
• On-site inspections
• Result: US knows
more about Russian
strategic forces

Data Exchanges and Updates
New START Numbers, Sept 2012
New START Limit

US

Russia

Deployed SDVs (700)

806

491

Deployed and non-deployed
launchers and bombers (800)

1034

884

Deployed warheads (1550)

1722

1499

Source: U.S. Department of State

Potential US Cost Savings
• Robust strategic triad
• Need to recapitalize
• Ballistic missile
submarines
• Heavy bombers
• ICBMs

• Budget demands

Non-Proliferation Goals
• US nuclear reductions bolster diplomacy
to block nuclear proliferation
• US, Russia have to act

• Won’t solve North Korea or Iran
• Strengthens position to mobilize pressure
against states seeking nuclear weapons

A Word on Deterrence
• Nuclear deterrence
during the Cold War
• At several points,
world was lucky
• Cuban missile crisis
• Test errors
• US-Norwegian
sounding rocket

Towards Lower
Numbers … and Zero?
• President Obama’s Prague speech
• Reduce role and number
• Zero attractive to US?

• But many challenges to resolve before
could even get close to zero
• Still, properly designed reductions can
enhance US security

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
OPPORTUNITIES IN 2013

US, Russian Nuclear
Warhead Levels
Deployed strategic warheads *
Nonstrategic warheads
Non-deployed (reserve)
strategic warheads
Retired warheads
Total warheads
*

US
~1950
~500
~2500

Russia
~2430
~2000
?

~3000

~5000

~8000 ~10,000

Estimated actual number, not New START accountable number
Numbers drawn from Kristensen/Norris, “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012” and “Russian
Nuclear Forces, 2012,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

New US-Russia Negotiation
• Limit each side to no more than 20002500 total nuclear warheads
• Sublimit of 1000 deployed strategic warheads
• Limit of 500 deployed missiles, bombers

• Overall warhead limit forces trade
• Result = ~50% reduction
• US still could maintain robust triad
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Missile Defense in Europe
• “European Phased
Adaptive Approach”
•
•
•
•

(1) SM-3 IA, sea-based
(2) SM-3 IB, Romania
(3) SM-3 IIA, Poland
(4) SM-3 IIB

• Endorsed by NATO

NATO, Russia and MD
• Russian concern about EPAA
• Offense-defense relationship

• NATO seeks cooperative missile defense
• But Russians want “legal” guarantee

• Cooperative missile defense system
• Political commitment
• Jointly manned centers
• Transparency

CTBT Ratification
• Testing moratorium
• Senate did not approve CTBT in 1999
• What has changed since then?
• Stockpile stewardship program
• Improved monitoring system

• CTBT locks in US advantage
• Spur ratification by others

Multilateralizing Process
• Lay groundwork to broaden process
• UNSC P5 discussions

CHALLENGES TO ARMS CONTROL

Russian Position
• No enthusiasm for new negotiations now
• Nuclear weapons = key to superpower status
• Link to issues such as missile defense and
conventional forces

• Waiting to see who will be US president
• US strategic advantages may give Russians
motive for further reductions

Data Exchanges and Updates
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Allies and Assurance
• ~200 US nuclear
bombs believed
deployed in Europe
• Russians will insist
weapons be based on
national territory
• Acceptable in right
circumstances?
Source: “U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012”

Verification
• Monitoring warheads in storage
• New ground for both sides

• Lower monitoring confidence

Senate Republicans
• Skeptical about nuclear arms control
• New START ratification proved more difficult
than expected

• Seek commitment to US strategic force
modernization
• Treaty or unilateral steps?

Prospects
• President Obama has indicated desire to
negotiate further nuclear cuts
• Governor Romney skeptical of arms control
• But tight defense budget, NATO considerations
could affect his view

• Possible incentives for Moscow to negotiate
• Have opportunity in 2013 – will we use it?
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